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THE OBAMA INTERNATIONAL TAX PLAN: 
A MAJOR STEP FORWARD 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On May 4, 2009, President Obama in person introduced a set of proposals to reform 
U.S. international taxation that are the most significant advance toward preserving the 
income tax on cross-border transactions since the enactment of Subpart F by the 
Kennedy Administration in 1962. In essence, the Obama proposals (the “Obama 
Plan”) introduce a 21st Century version of the vision begun by Thomas Adams in 
1918 and continued by Stanley Surrey in 1961: A world in which source and 
residence taxation are coordinated so as to achieve the underlying goals of the 
international tax regime. As I have explained at length elsewhere, these goals are the 
Single Tax Principle (all income from cross-border transactions should be subject to 
tax once, not more and not less) and the Benefits Principle (active income should be 
taxed primarily at source, passive income primarily at residence).2 The Obama Plan 
does this by addressing the central problem of implementing corporate and individual 
income taxation in a world of open economies: Effective source taxation requires 
residence taxation, and effective residence taxation requires source taxation. 
 
In what follows, I will comment on the major proposals in the Obama Plan and 
explain how they form a coherent step forward toward achieving the Single Tax and 
Benefit Principles. I will first address the proposals related to the taxation of active 
income earned by corporations, and then the proposals related to the taxation of 
passive income earned by individuals.  
 
2. Corporate Taxation: Source Taxation Requires Residence Taxation 
 
The taxation of active income earned by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is assigned 
by the consensus underlying the international tax regime primarily to the source 
country. This makes sense both because the source country provides the benefits that 
enable the income to be earned (such as infrastructure and education) and because 
active income is earned primarily by corporations and source-based corporate 
taxation is more sensible than residence-based taxation because corporate residence is 
not very meaningful. 
 
However, as has been recognized by numerous scholars as well as the OECD since 
the 1990s, source-based taxation of active income is increasingly difficult because of 
tax competition among countries to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 
                                                 
1 Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM, the University of Michigan. 
2 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the International 
Tax Regime (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), ch. 1. 
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addition, various techniques have been developed by MNEs to shift their income 
from high tax to low tax jurisdiction either by transfer pricing or by various earnings 
stripping techniques (such as thin capitalization and the judicious placing of 
intangible assets in tax havens). The result, as the Obama Plan notes at the outset, is 
that in 2003 nearly one third of the profits by US-based MNEs were located in 
Bermuda, the Netherlands and Ireland, and that of the top ten locations of such profits 
seven had effective tax rates of less than 10%.3 
 
In this environment, effective source-based taxation of MNEs requires a backup in 
the form of effective residence-based taxation. Since over 90% of the parent 
corporations of MNEs are resident in OECD member countries, if all the OECD 
countries abolished deferral or exemption of the income of Controlled Foreign 
Corporations (CFCs) belonging to “their” MNEs, then tax competition would cease to 
be a significant problem and source-based taxation of active income would once 
again be possible, just as it was before globalization took off in the 1980s. 
 
The Obama Proposal takes several significant steps in this direction, First, it curtails 
the benefit of deferral by limiting deductions (other than R&E deductions) taken by 
US-based MNEs on their tax return that are associated with earning income eligible 
for deferral until the underlying earnings have been repatriated. This proposal, which 
is based on legislation introduced by Chairman Rangel in 2007, is estimated to raise 
$60.1 billion between 2011 and 2019. 
 
Since R&E is excluded because of the positive externalities that it generates, the main 
deductions affected are interest and various forms of headquarters expenses allocated 
to foreign source income. In this context, it is interesting that the Obama Proposal is 
silent on whether the worldwide interest allocation enacted in 2004 and currently 
scheduled to take effect in 2011 will in fact be implemented (it was eliminated in 
Chairman Rangel’s legislation). 
 
The Obama Proposal on deferral is much more conservative than some commentators 
envisaged when the idea of reforming deferral was broached in the President’s 
Budget. For example, the Treasury Subpart F Report from 2000 (written when Larry 
Summers was Secretary and therefore of continued relevance today) suggested a total 
repeal of deferral with a lower tax rate for foreign source income, or making deferral 
conditional on the effective foreign tax rate (a so-called “low tax inclusion”, the 
mirror image on the current high-tax exclusion from Subpart F).4 The Administration 
                                                 
3 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Kimberly Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global 
Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, The Hamilton Project, Brookings 
Institution (2007); also in 2007 TNT 114-38 (June 13, 2007) and in Jason Furman and Jason E. 
Bordoff (eds.), Path to Prosperity: Hamilton Project Ideas on Income Security, Education, and 
Taxes, 319 (2008). 
4 See Treasury Subpart F Report (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic 
of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, Tax Notes Int’l (June 8, 1998). 
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presumably concluded that these types of proposals would run into too much 
opposition from the MNEs in the name of competitiveness.  
 
Second, the Obama Proposal reins in various forms of foreign tax credit abuse such as 
foreign tax credit generators (like the ones used by AIG) and transactions that purport 
to generate current foreign tax credits while the underlying income is subject to 
deferral. While the details are still unclear, the first proposal would focus on granting 
foreign tax credits only for taxes that the taxpayer “actually pays,” which presumably 
refers to various techniques that use the “technical taxpayer rule” to obtain credits for 
taxes economically borne by another party to the transaction. The second proposal 
relates to schemes built on the Guardian case, in which the taxpayer used a 
Luxembourg form of consolidation to obtain direct credits for taxes paid by a 
Luxembourg holding company (which was treated as a branch for US tax purposes) 
while maintaining deferral for the underlying earnings in the operating Luxembourg 
subsidiary. The IRS has attacked this type of structure in regulations, but the 
regulations depend on the use of foreign consolidation, and the same result can be 
achieved simply by using a hybrid (US branch, foreign corporation) as the holding 
company and a reverse hybrid (US corporation, foreign branch) as the operating 
subsidiary. The two foreign tax credit proposals together raise $43 billion from 2011 
to 2019. These revenues and the revenues from curtailing deferral are used to finally 
make the R&E credit permanent (which costs $74.5 billion over the same ten years). 
 
Third, the Obama Proposal revives Notice 98-11 by preventing MNEs from abusing 
“check the box” to make flows of passive income between CFCs disappear for 
Subpart F purposes. As the Proposal explains, if a US parent has a CFC in the 
Caymans with two second tier subsidiaries in Germany and in the Caymans, and the 
second tier Caymans sub makes a loan to the German sub, it is currently possible to 
avoid Subpart F inclusion of the interest paid from Germany to the Caymans by 
making both second tier subs appear to be branches of the Caymans holding 
company. Since you cannot lend money to yourself, the result is no loan and no 
interest income, but the interest deduction is still effective to transfer profits from 
Germany to the Caymans. This provision raises a whopping $86.5 billion from 2011 
to 2019 (indicating that in the Administration’s view MNEs cannot achieve the same 
result without relying on “check the box”, as they argued successfully in 1997 in 
support of the “check the box” rule).5 
 
This is essentially the same as Example 2 of Notice 98-11, and the MNEs would no 
doubt object like they did in 1998 that the only tax avoided is the German tax. But 
double non-taxation violates the Single Tax Principle, which has been an underlying 
idea of the US international tax regime since 1918. As Thomas Adams stated when 
explaining why the US uses a foreign tax credit rather than an exemption to prevent 
double taxation, “the state which with a fine regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes 
                                                 
5 One concern that needs to be addressed is that if the proposal focuses only on “disregarded entities,” the 
same results can be achieved by constructing partnerships between CFCs. Another issue is IRS 954(c)(6), 
the CFC to CFC payment rule first enacted in 2006, which can lead to the same result and should be 
allowed to expire at the end of 2009 as scheduled.  
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pains to relieve double taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure that the person or 
property pays at least one tax." 
 
The MNEs would no doubt argue that these steps to enhance residence-based taxation 
adversely impact their competitiveness. But they have been making the same 
argument since 1961, with no regard to the actual competitive position of US-based 
MNEs (in 1961, they dominated the world) and without any evidence that any of the 
changes to US international tax rules in the last 48 years have in fact adversely 
affected them.        
 
A more serious concern is that these parts of the Obama Plan would induce US-based 
MNEs to migrate their headquarters to other locations with laxer rules, and that new 
businesses that are run from the US would be established with foreign parent 
companies. The anti-inversion rules enacted in 2004 establish some defense against 
the first threat but are ineffective against the second.6 Because of this I would suggest 
that Congress enact the “managed and controlled” provision of Sen. Levin and Rep. 
Doggett’s Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, which would treat as a US resident any 
corporation that is publicly traded or has over $50 million in assets and that is not a 
CFC if its actual management is in the United States. I doubt that too many CEOs of 
US-based parents would actually be willing to move to tax havens in response (since 
the level of services in the havens is commensurate with the level of taxation). 
 
In the longer term, I would urge the Obama Administration to seek to curtail deferral 
further in cooperation with the OECD. If all OECD countries acted in unison to 
abolish deferral, then tax competition could be eliminated without any threat to the 
competitiveness of US-based MNEs. The Obama Plan is a helpful first step in this 
direction, and could be used as a way of persuading other OECD members to follow 
suit (like they did for example in prohibiting foreign bribes by their MNEs after the 
US enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).  
 
Corporations should be taxed primarily at source, and one can imagine an ideal world 
of purely source-based corporate taxation (if transfer pricing and other forms of 
shifting income are taken care of).7 But in a world of open economies source-based 
corporate taxation must be backed up by residence-based corporate taxation, because 
otherwise tax competition and artificial income shifting lead to no corporate taxation 
at all (Intel notoriously pays not a penny in tax outside the US, and the overall 
effective tax rate of US-based MNEs on foreign source profits is very low). The 
corporate provisions of the Obama Plan are an important first step in preserving the 
US corporate tax base from erosion, and help level the playing field between US-
based MNEs and purely domestic businesses subject to the full 35% US corporate tax 
rate.   
 
    
 
                                                 
6 IRC 7874. 
7 See Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra. 
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3. Individual Taxation: Residence Taxation Requires Source Taxation 
 
The recent UBS saga has shown that effective residence-based taxation of US 
individual citizens and residents is impossible in the absence of US source taxation of 
foreigners. Beginning with the enactment of the portfolio interest exemption in 1984, 
the US has engaged in a race to the bottom designed to attract residents of other 
countries to invest their funds in the US without having to report the income to their 
home jurisdiction. Thus, we permit such foreign residents to earn investment income 
from US sources without meaningful withholding (capital gains, interest and royalties 
are exempt, and dividends can be replaced with dividend substitutes) and without the 
US payor having any information about the real identity of the payee (interest can be 
paid directly to tax haven corporations, while royalties and dividends can be paid to 
Qualified Intermediaries, and in both cases the US withholding agent will not know 
who the real payee is). 
 
The problem, as the UBS case revealed, is that these rules enable US residents to also 
earn US source investment income without paying any tax on it. The provisions that 
are designed to prevent this, such as legends on bearer certificates and audits of 
Qualified Intermediaries by foreign auditors, do not work. 
 
The Obama Plan contains several helpful provisions designed to prevent US residents 
from evading US taxation. The Plan constructs a dichotomy between investors 
through Qualified Intermediaries (QIs) and other investors. In the case of QIs— 
The Administration’s plan would increase the reporting requirement on 
international investors and financial institutions, especially QIs.  QIs would be 
required to report information on their U.S. customers to the same extent that U.S. 
financial intermediaries must.  And U.S. customers at QIs would no longer be 
allowed to hide behind foreign entities.  U.S. investors would be required to report 
transfers of money or property made to or from non-QI foreign financial 
institutions on their income tax returns.  Financial institutions would face 
enhanced information reporting requirements for transactions that establish a 
foreign business entity or transfer assets to and from foreign financial accounts on 
behalf of U.S. individuals.  
In the case of investors through non-QIs, the Obama Proposals would (a) impose a 
withholding tax of 20-30% on US-source payments to individuals who use non-QIs, 
refundable upon a showing that the true recipient is a non-US resident, (b) create a 
rebuttable presumption that any foreign account held by the US citizen at a non-QI is 
subject to FBAR, and (c) increase penalties and extend the statute of limitations.  
In addition, the line between QIs and non-QIs would be enforced by requiring all 
affiliates of a QI to be QIs. These proposals together raise only a modest $8.7 billion 
over ten years, a far more conservative estimate than others have suggested for 
similar proposals (e.g., the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act). 
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This solution is similar to the EU Savings Directive in that it relies on information 
exchange (in the case of QIs) and refundable withholding (in the case of non-QIs). In 
principle it should work, but the devil is in the details. For example, how will the QI 
rules be effectively enforced in the face of foreign bank secrecy claims such as those 
currently advanced by UBS? 
Another issue is that the non-QI rules only apply to US-source income, but many 
types of investment income that economically is US-source is treated as non-US 
source under current rules. For example, capital gains are sourced to the residence of 
the seller (who will purport to be a foreign investor), and dividend substitutes under 
equity swaps are sourced to the residence of the recipient.8  
Still, the Obama Plan is definitely a step in the right direction towards enforcing 
residence-based taxation on US citizens and residents. Enacting the Stop Tax Haven 
Abuse Act, which has the support of the Obama Administration, would be another 
advance toward the same goal. Further steps require cooperation by other countries, 
lest they induce investor flight from the US. The key observation here is that funds 
cannot remain in tax havens and be productive; they must be reinvested into the 
prosperous and stable economies of the world (which is why some laundered funds 
that need to remain in the tax havens earn a negative interest rate). If the rich 
countries could agree, they could eliminate the tax havens’ harmful activities 
overnight by, for example, imposing a refundable withholding tax (e.g., at 35%) on 
all payments to noncooperating tax havens, or more broadly, to all nontreaty 
countries, and insisting on effective automatic exchange of information with treaty 
countries. The withholding tax would be refunded upon a showing that the income 
was reported to the residence country. This idea is similar to, but much broader than, 
the refundable withholding tax proposal in the Obama Plan.9  
 
The financial services industry would no doubt lobby hard against such a step, on the 
grounds that it would induce investors to shift funds to other OECD member 
countries. However, the EU and Japan have both committed themselves to taxing 
their residents on foreign-source interest income. The EU Savings Directive, in 
particular, requires all EU members to cooperate in exchange of information or 
impose a withholding tax on interest paid to EU residents. Both the EU and Japan 
would like to extend this treatment to income from the United States. Thus, this 
would seem an appropriate moment to cooperate with other OECD member countries 
by imposing a withholding tax on payments to tax havens that cannot be induced to 
cooperate in exchanging information, without triggering a flow of capital out of the 
OECD. 
 
Fundamentally, in a globalized world with open economies, residence taxation of individuals 
is impossible without source-based taxation, because in the absence of source taxation the 
information required to ensure residence taxation is not available. The Obama Plan 
                                                 
8 This problem can be solved if dividend substitutes are treated as dividends, as envisaged by the Stop Tax 
Haven Abuse Act. 
9 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A Coordinated Withholding Tax On Deductible Payments, Shelf Project Proposal, 
119 Tax Notes 993 (June 2, 2008). 
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recognizes this reality and is a major step forward toward achieving taxation of US citizens 
and residents based on their true ability to pay. 
  
4. Conclusion 
 
As the President stated in introducing the Obama Plan, 
 
Nobody likes paying taxes, particularly in times of economic stress.  But most 
Americans meet their responsibilities because they understand that it's an 
obligation of citizenship, necessary to pay the costs of our common defense and 
our mutual well-being. 
 
And yet, even as most American citizens and businesses meet these 
responsibilities, there are others who are shirking theirs. And many are aided and 
abetted by a broken tax system, written by well-connected lobbyists on behalf of 
well-heeled interests and individuals.  It's a tax code full of corporate loopholes 
that makes it perfectly legal for companies to avoid paying their fair share.  It's a 
tax code that makes it all too easy for a small number of individuals and 
companies to abuse overseas tax havens to avoid paying any taxes at all.  And it's 
a tax code that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, 
India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York. 
 
Now, understand, one of the strengths of our economy is the global reach of our 
businesses.  And I want to see our companies remain the most competitive in the 
world.  But the way to make sure that happens is not to reward our companies for 
moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to overseas tax havens.  This is 
something that I talked about again and again during the course of the campaign.  
The way we make our businesses competitive is not to reward American 
companies operating overseas with a roughly 2 percent tax rate on foreign profits; 
a rate that costs taxpayers tens of billions of dollars a year.  The way to make 
American businesses competitive is not to let some citizens and businesses dodge 
their responsibilities while ordinary Americans pick up the slack. 
 
The Obama Plan for reforming US international tax rules is incomplete, and it will no 
doubt be much amended in Congress. But it represents a crucial first step that is based 
on the realization that in our interdependent world, it is not possible to achieve either 
source or residence-based taxation without the other form being effectively 
implemented. And that without taxing cross-border income, all income taxation 
becomes impossible, because income taxation requires taxing capital and capital is 
mobile across borders. If we want to preserve the income tax and retain some 
progressivity in our tax system, the Obama Plan should be enacted as soon as 
possible. 
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